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Prediction and Personality-related Outcomes
Abstract
Prediction of important life outcomes from personality attributes is an 
important endeavor for a variety of reasons, not least of which is developing 
causal explanations for those outcomes.  A “homogeneity of effects” 
criterion for attributing causation to a broad superordinate trait is 
unnecessarily stringent, and current knowledge of personality structure is 
not yet sufficient to fruitfully implement the proposal.  
Prediction and Personality-related Outcomes
There are many ways in which personality trait-outcome research 
might be made more rigorous (e.g., better measures, more longitudinal 
designs, larger and more heterogeneous samples), but in his target article 
Mõttus (this issue) focuses on meta-theoretical concerns.  He suggests that 
concurrent or predictive relations between traits and outcomes are largely of
interest only if they can be understood as causal. He then argues that if the 
causal source of the associated outcome is to be understood as a unitary 
trait, then facets (and items) should be equally related to that outcome, with 
the allowance that this relation may vary to the extent that the facets (or 
items) are differentially saturated with the putative causal trait—a condition 
one might describe as “homogeneity among effects.”   I will argue that 
prediction consistent with a causal model is the present reasonable limit for 
explaining trait-outcome relations; and however much the homogeneity of 
effects criterion might serve the development of a causal argument, it is not 
necessary and is presently beyond routine research practice.
Prediction is not only some substitute for casual explanation.  For 
empirical forecasting, a correlate of the true causal variable may be useful 
(e.g., a residential postal code may be practically useful when setting car 
insurance rates).  In many instances that would concern personality 
psychologists, the casual pathway between a set of personality traits and 
distal outcomes may be so tortuous (Meehl’s 1978 account of “context-
dependent “stochastologicals” come to mind) as to undermine any general 
causal account.  In such a circumstance, playing at causal explanation is self-
deception:  All we can do is predict.
But suppose we do think that some trait-outcome relationship is 
relatively straightforward, and we set out to employ the logic Mõttus 
describes.  Which facets are to be employed?  While we have general 
agreement about the broad factor structure of personality traits (but are 
there five or six?), there is no consensus on facets; indeed no clear reason to
prefer a facet substructure, as opposed to say, a circumplex-like model.  
Understanding a trait as the cause of an outcome should immediately 
engage theorizing about mediating processes and the testing of more 
demanding models.  In the development of a causal argument to explain a 
trait-outcome association, I will grant that homogeneity among facet effects 
provides support for attributing the cause to the broader trait; and the 
absence of such homogeneity may lead to causal attribution to a facet.  But 
while Mõttus’ discussion of the implications of homogeneity of effects for 
causal arguments makes a persuasive case in principle, we know far too little
about the relations of facets to traits (or items to facets) to believe that 
considerations other than differential factor saturation can be set aside.  
There are likely causal relations among facets; and even if two facets have 
identical relations to a primary factor, they may be differentially related to 
other factors which are themselves related (differentially) to the outcome of 
interest.  If  item-facet and facet-trait relations are truly described by simple 
structure effect indicator models, then Mõttus’ homogeneity of effects 
condition does strengthen causal claims for the broad trait, but given the 
absence of empirically grounded agreement about the facet structure of any 
broad personality trait, and the lack of real discussion about what would 
count as appropriate boundaries for any facet item pool, it seems premature 
to claim that simple structure effect indicator models can be presumed as 
the foundational personality structure and that we are ready to undertake 
the path envisioned in the target article.
There are some difficult but surely not insurmountable methodological 
problems that would arise even if a simple structure effects indicator 
structure of a broad trait was clearly sufficient: How would tests for facet 
effect homogeneity be undertaken?  Simple differences between correlations
are notorious lacking in power.  If regression models and incremental validity
methods are applied, measurement error issues becomes especially 
problematic; and if testing models where correlated latent facets with 
coefficients fixed equal are estimated as predictors of an outcome, sufficient 
power will guarantee that homogeneity of effects will be rejected.  If across 
multiple sufficiently powered studies one facet carries the entire predictive 
burden, then attributing causality to that facet rather than the larger trait 
seems appropriate, but this is a far different standard than the argument for 
homogenous effects I understand Mõttus to be making.
Despite my misgivings, above, I nevertheless agree with the target 
article in recognizing that if facets differentially predict outcomes, it is 
problematic to act as if they don’t by attributing the relationship to the 
global trait.  But I take from this insight a different lesson:  It is terribly 
important to engage with the question of the substructure of personality 
factors, to understand constituent elements, some of which may be partial 
causal functions of the unitary existential trait, and also partial functions of 
other facets within that and other domains.   That is, there may be causal 
relations among facets, as posited in some network models.  Without an 
elucidation of this structure, addressing questions about the causal relations 
of traits to distal outcomes seems premature.  Presently, prediction must 
suffice.
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